One extra worker rules out the square-root welfare compromise
Source: github.com/bocowgill/worker-compromise/tree/2c377b62b66f79a…
A clearinghouse observes a market with n firms and n+1 workers and can choose any stable assignment. Both sides draw independent rate-one exponential utilities for every firm-worker pair. Changing partners costs log(n)/(6 sqrt(n)). Write δ = 1/400000. As n grows, with probability tending to one, every stable assignment gives the matched workers a mean partner rank greater than n^(1/2+δ) and a mean utility less than (1/2−δ) log(n). Rank one is best. Consequently, even a clearinghouse that chooses separately for each objective cannot deliver mean partner ranks at the square-root benchmark on…
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