Id: palomar/PALOMAR-2026-11-20-000012 Url: https://github.com/bocowgill/worker-compromise/tree/2c377b62b66f79ae9bbf127af1ec5ab0b2ea5468 Json: https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-11-20-000012-v1.json Repo: https://github.com/bocowgill/worker-compromise Tags: econ.TH, math.PR, msc:91B68, msc:60C05 Score: 0 Title: One extra worker rules out the square-root welfare compromise Trust: high Domain: econ.TH Source: palomar Authors: Bo Cowgill Reviews: 0 Subject: econ.TH Category: research Comments: 0 Disputed: false Division: econ Mentions: 0 Verified: true Discussed: 0 Published: 2026-11-20 Formalized: true Page: https://delphi.science/r/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-11-20-000012 A clearinghouse observes a market with n firms and n+1 workers and can choose any stable assignment. Both sides draw independent rate-one exponential utilities for every firm-worker pair. Changing partners costs log(n)/(6 sqrt(n)). Write δ = 1/400000. As n grows, with probability tending to one, every stable assignment gives the matched workers a mean partner rank greater than n^(1/2+δ) and a mean utility less than (1/2−δ) log(n). Rank one is best. Consequently, even a clearinghouse that chooses separately for each objective cannot deliver mean partner ranks at the square-root benchmark on…